The New York Times has published a preview of its upcoming Sunday magazine cover article, "Inside Obama's War on Terrorism."
1. Obama's approach to fighting terrorism demonstrates continuity with the Bush years more than it does change.
The major shift is rhetorical with little political change to speak of. Obama has worked to reclaim the message that the US is fighting terrorists and not Islam, which he articulated in his June 2009 Cairo discourse. Why no more substantial policy differences?
-Because the administration is learning that Bush era policies are either necessary or too well-crafted to be easily dismantled.
-Many important evolutions to the counterterrorism strategy had already begun by the end of the Bush presidency (such as transferring Gitmo detainees and emptying many of the CIA's secret foreign prisons)
According to Bush's former CIA Director Michael Hayden, "It's really, really hard to find a difference that's meaningful and not atmospheric." The absence of sweeping change has angered many Obama supporters on the left who worry how much further Obama will lean toward Bush policies should the US fall under attack on his watch.
2. Special focus on John Brennan, assistant to the president for homeland security and counterterrorism, and his privileged place at the center of Obama's inner circle for national security.
-A career CIA man, Brennan eventually became George Tenet's chief of staff then the agency's Deputy Executive Director before quitting the government in 2005. Shortly after his departure, Brennan penned an op-ed criticizing the Bush administration ("Mr. President, You're Wrong on Iraq"), which he submitted for CIA clearance then withdrew. It was leaked to the White House thus thrusting him entirely out of the graces of the president's team.
-Brennan is close to former NSA Tony Lake, who introduced him to Obama during the campaign. On election, Obama considered naming Brennan as CIA Director before confronting two major problems: the would-be perception of Brennan's proximity to Tenet and his support of many of Bush's enhanced interrogation tactics including "black site" secret CIA prisons abroad (though Brennan did voice opposition to waterboarding)
3. Finally, the article evokes the emerging frontiers of terrorism, highlighting the success of drones in Pakistan, increased US funding to support Yemen anti-terror efforts, and the threat of American extremists who train abroad with the intention of carrying out attacks at home.
- Amy Greene
Showing posts with label Pakistan. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Pakistan. Show all posts
Tuesday, January 5, 2010
Monday, December 7, 2009
NYT: MAKING OF THE AFPAK STRATEGY
This excellent piece in the New York Times lays out how Obama came to choose his recently-announced AfPak surge strategy, focusing both on the process and the actors involved. This must-read piece is based on extensive interviews mainly with the principles and is elsewhere corroborated wherever possible.
Interestingly:
- The manner in which Obama conducted the review encouraged transparency (but confidentiality), frankness, lengthy debate over well-defined opinions, diversity of ideas, and clarity of purpose (also perceived as a lack of deference) from a non-military president confronting a military bureaucracy largely formed by the Bush administration's notion of the treatment of war.
- Gates was of central importance in defining the numbers and mechanics of the strategy. The selection of Gates' own proposal to send 30,000 US troops (with an additional 10,000 coming from NATO) ultimately reflects the president's trust in him - yet another demonstration of the significant bipartisan respect Gates commands throughout Washington.
- Gates, Clinton, and Jones' harmonious collaboration was key to a more thorough examination and to avoiding inter-department drama during the more delicate moments. One example: Clinton was unafraid of asking tough questions about troop specifics that might be seen, in another administration, as stepping on Pentagon turf. This posed no such problem during the recent review process.
- Clinton took leadership with Karzai by compelling him to publicly commit to delivering results. She heavily influenced the content of his inaugural address in which he vowed to clean up corruption and take control of the security situation while making reference to timetables to accomplish this.
- Biden's opposition successfully narrowed the mission and secured Obama's commitment to withdrawal dates, even if his opposition to the surge was not heeded.
- Holbrooke was absent from this process from start to finish. After storming out on a meeting with Karzai and remaining silent since, Holbrooke's place in the AfPak process to come seems precarious at best.
- Amy Greene
Interestingly:
- The manner in which Obama conducted the review encouraged transparency (but confidentiality), frankness, lengthy debate over well-defined opinions, diversity of ideas, and clarity of purpose (also perceived as a lack of deference) from a non-military president confronting a military bureaucracy largely formed by the Bush administration's notion of the treatment of war.
- Gates was of central importance in defining the numbers and mechanics of the strategy. The selection of Gates' own proposal to send 30,000 US troops (with an additional 10,000 coming from NATO) ultimately reflects the president's trust in him - yet another demonstration of the significant bipartisan respect Gates commands throughout Washington.
- Gates, Clinton, and Jones' harmonious collaboration was key to a more thorough examination and to avoiding inter-department drama during the more delicate moments. One example: Clinton was unafraid of asking tough questions about troop specifics that might be seen, in another administration, as stepping on Pentagon turf. This posed no such problem during the recent review process.
- Clinton took leadership with Karzai by compelling him to publicly commit to delivering results. She heavily influenced the content of his inaugural address in which he vowed to clean up corruption and take control of the security situation while making reference to timetables to accomplish this.
- Biden's opposition successfully narrowed the mission and secured Obama's commitment to withdrawal dates, even if his opposition to the surge was not heeded.
- Holbrooke was absent from this process from start to finish. After storming out on a meeting with Karzai and remaining silent since, Holbrooke's place in the AfPak process to come seems precarious at best.
- Amy Greene
Wednesday, December 2, 2009
IMPRESSIONS OF OBAMA'S AFPAK REMARKS
Last night at West Point, President Obama showed considerable confidence as Commander in Chief as he explained his decision to send 30,000 additional US troops to fight the war in Afghanistan/Pakistan with the first withdrawals beginning in July 2011 and complete pullout by the end of 2011 (depending on ground conditions).
Some reflections on the speech:
The speech did a good job of explaining why the US is in Afghanistan by providing a succinct historical overview dating back to 9/11, without further dramatizing the tragedy of that day. Obama outlined an 18-month window in order to create urgency among Afghans to take responsibility for their own country, effectively ending the "blank check" policy of the Bush administration to the Karzai government. How will this impact Taliban strategy? Knowing the limits of US engagement, will they simply wait it out?
By systematically recalling the early and overwhelming domestic and international support for the US intervention, and by invoking both NATO and the UN, Obama reminded the international community and allies of their past promises and current obligations. While increased allied presence may not come in the form of additional combat troops, Obama seemed to be inciting them to make a greater and more noticeable contribution in some form. Near the end of the speech, Obama mentioned that the US has not always been thanked for its efforts to intervene in the name of global security. This could be read as unspoken criticism of reluctant allies whose collective security is nonetheless affected by the AfPak situation. Perhaps directed in part at allies like French President Nicolas Sarkozy, who has previously rejected the idea of sending additional troops. Most recently, both President Sarkozy and Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner reportedly rebuffed two appeals that came directly from President Obama and Secretary Clinton, respectively, to send 1,500 more French soldiers.
The President successfully painted the AfPak war in the context of his greater foreign policy objectives (ending this war and preventing new conflict, securing loose nuclear material, stopping the spread of nuclear weapons, and ultimately working to a no-nuclear world) and in the global context of US moral values (human rights, rigorous use of diplomacy, freedom, US's special security burden of the past decades) without neglecting to repeatedly mention the ailing US economy and the cost borne by its war weary citizens. In attempting to reassure the 54% of Americans who disapprove of any troop escalation, Obama also answered the primary critics of an Afghan surge (notably the comparisons to Vietnam) in a respectful manner.
In an interesting aside, Obama stated that the US seeks partnership with Afghanistan and Pakistan based on mutual interest, trust, and respect rather than patronage. This "partnership vs. patronage" construction is the same used in a speech he gave to Europe on his first Presidential trip to the continent.
Overall, this address covered all of the necessary bases while successfully explaining the need to escalate. The tone was balanced and decidedly centrist, and the President made sure to outline both the thought and rigor that went into the process.
Still, questions remain unanswered:
-Is the AfPak strategy sufficiently focused on Pakistan and the ways in which its actions both de-legitimize America's progress in Afghanistan and destabilize security conditions in that country?
- Will additional US troops and funding in Afghanistan make any difference without a more coherent and tougher approach to Islamabad? How will the new strategy redefine the US/Pakistan partnership? How will its performance be measured?
- Though European reactions were generally positive, not many allies immediately stepped up to increase their commitments. Perhaps they were hedging their bets until after the January 2010 London conference to be held on Afghanistan. The following remains to be seen:
- How deeply does the EU perceive Afghanistan to be a direct threat to its collective security and to what point is Europe ready to give more to the mission? Will the EU offer a truly "European" approach to Afghanistan, complete with non-negotiables and concessions that it can take to the table in discussions with the US? Or will EU member states prefer instead to rely once again on their US bilateral relationships to hammer out the terms and nature of future commitments?
- And what will be the consequences to the already-troubled transatlantic alliance if the US is convinced that Europe did not make a full, good-faith effort to drum up support for the joint mission at its most critical hour?
-Amy Greene
Some reflections on the speech:
The speech did a good job of explaining why the US is in Afghanistan by providing a succinct historical overview dating back to 9/11, without further dramatizing the tragedy of that day. Obama outlined an 18-month window in order to create urgency among Afghans to take responsibility for their own country, effectively ending the "blank check" policy of the Bush administration to the Karzai government. How will this impact Taliban strategy? Knowing the limits of US engagement, will they simply wait it out?
By systematically recalling the early and overwhelming domestic and international support for the US intervention, and by invoking both NATO and the UN, Obama reminded the international community and allies of their past promises and current obligations. While increased allied presence may not come in the form of additional combat troops, Obama seemed to be inciting them to make a greater and more noticeable contribution in some form. Near the end of the speech, Obama mentioned that the US has not always been thanked for its efforts to intervene in the name of global security. This could be read as unspoken criticism of reluctant allies whose collective security is nonetheless affected by the AfPak situation. Perhaps directed in part at allies like French President Nicolas Sarkozy, who has previously rejected the idea of sending additional troops. Most recently, both President Sarkozy and Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner reportedly rebuffed two appeals that came directly from President Obama and Secretary Clinton, respectively, to send 1,500 more French soldiers.
The President successfully painted the AfPak war in the context of his greater foreign policy objectives (ending this war and preventing new conflict, securing loose nuclear material, stopping the spread of nuclear weapons, and ultimately working to a no-nuclear world) and in the global context of US moral values (human rights, rigorous use of diplomacy, freedom, US's special security burden of the past decades) without neglecting to repeatedly mention the ailing US economy and the cost borne by its war weary citizens. In attempting to reassure the 54% of Americans who disapprove of any troop escalation, Obama also answered the primary critics of an Afghan surge (notably the comparisons to Vietnam) in a respectful manner.
In an interesting aside, Obama stated that the US seeks partnership with Afghanistan and Pakistan based on mutual interest, trust, and respect rather than patronage. This "partnership vs. patronage" construction is the same used in a speech he gave to Europe on his first Presidential trip to the continent.
Overall, this address covered all of the necessary bases while successfully explaining the need to escalate. The tone was balanced and decidedly centrist, and the President made sure to outline both the thought and rigor that went into the process.
Still, questions remain unanswered:
-Is the AfPak strategy sufficiently focused on Pakistan and the ways in which its actions both de-legitimize America's progress in Afghanistan and destabilize security conditions in that country?
- Will additional US troops and funding in Afghanistan make any difference without a more coherent and tougher approach to Islamabad? How will the new strategy redefine the US/Pakistan partnership? How will its performance be measured?
- Though European reactions were generally positive, not many allies immediately stepped up to increase their commitments. Perhaps they were hedging their bets until after the January 2010 London conference to be held on Afghanistan. The following remains to be seen:
- How deeply does the EU perceive Afghanistan to be a direct threat to its collective security and to what point is Europe ready to give more to the mission? Will the EU offer a truly "European" approach to Afghanistan, complete with non-negotiables and concessions that it can take to the table in discussions with the US? Or will EU member states prefer instead to rely once again on their US bilateral relationships to hammer out the terms and nature of future commitments?
- And what will be the consequences to the already-troubled transatlantic alliance if the US is convinced that Europe did not make a full, good-faith effort to drum up support for the joint mission at its most critical hour?
-Amy Greene
Sunday, November 15, 2009
THE WEEK IN US FOREIGN POLICY (9-15 NOVEMBER)
AFGHANISTAN
Obama has yet to issue a decision on an Afghan strategy. There are 4 options on the table - McChrystal's “all-in” of 40,000 troops; Gates/Clinton's preferred "middle road" of 30,000 troops; a more "user friendly" option of 20,000 troops; and a fourth with no numbers attached. The "user friendly" option would surely better suit the public mood – currently 54% of the American public disapproves of escalation. The fourth option is seen as a gesture to Joe Biden, the administration's leading voice against sending more troops.
Obama has demonstrated a tendency to err on the side of meticulous decision-making rather than on speed. But as David Broder noted, sometimes any decision is better than none. Having already promised (and sent) more troops this summer, Obama demands that any further US action must be accompanied by "offramps," effective means to hand the job over to sufficiently trained Afghans.
A series of cables sent to Obama by Ambassador and General Karl Eikenberry were leaked this week, refreshing a stale debate in Washington while giving the president some additional political cover. By arguing against troop escalation (that would diminish Afghan ability to meet the challenges of a post-American Afghanistan) and by questioning both Karzai and his government’s corruption, Eikenberry returned the focus to questions surrounding the still-undefined strategy: Is the goal to capture Al-Qaeda? To root out the Taliban? Is it to bring security to the Afghan people? To battle corruption? What role for Pakistan? No consensus seems to exist around where the central focus lies.
ASIA
Obama traveled to Asia this week in a multi-stop tour of the region scheduled around the APEC summit and subsequent ASEAN leaders meeting. He also held a bilateral with Russian President Medvedev. The APEC meeting produced underwhelming results on climate change, as leaders failed to formalize a binding accord in advance of December's Copenhagen Summit.
The trip marks a milestone in US-Burma relations in which Obama and Burmese leaders sat at the same table. Though not a bilateral, Obama used the occasion to introduce direct talks to the current sanctions-heavy policy and to call for the release of Aung San Suu Kyi. While looking for new avenues to cooperate with China, Obama and President Hu Jintao are expected to discuss the value of the Chinese currency, increasing Chinese consumption of US goods, bilateral economic relations, and human rights.
Obama also has an obligation to use this trip to reassure smaller regional allies who view America’s realpolitik approach vis-à-vis big powers with skepticism. Obama must reassure them that America will help mitigate the rise of China and uphold its security guarantees in the face of China’s rise, Russian ambitions, and North Korean proliferation. Obama must make the effort to show these smaller allies that America will not relax its commitments and thus make acquiescence to Beijing an undesired - yet necessary - political choice for these nations.
MIDDLE EAST
On Monday, November 9, Obama sat down one-on-one with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Major topics purportedly included Mahmoud Abbas' threat to quit and the consequences of a possible collapse of the Palestinian Authority on the flagging peace process. Since Secretary Clinton called Israel's nine-month suspension of new settlements "unprecedented," the White House has fought to repair the fallout from Clinton's gaffe. Chief of Staff Rahm Emanuel called publicly for a full freeze. Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Bill Burns then said Israel's efforts "fall short" of their "obligations" under the roadmap. A good faith message to reassure Abbas, Burns' language is notable because Palestinians consider a settlement freeze an Israeli obligation rather than a mere “precondition.”
TERRORISM
Attorney General Eric Holder announced his decision to try 9/11 mastermind Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and four other Gitmo detainees in civilian federal court in New York. Should problems arise in the prosecution, Obama risks backlash from politicians who do not want terrorists brought to court in their districts. The political price could be retaliation against other parts of the Obama agenda. Nonetheless, Obama's move demonstrates the administration's eagerness to bring the perpetrators to justice (Mohammed has repeatedly confessed not only to planning 9/11 but also to killing Wall Street Journal reporter Daniel Pearl). Many critics regret this move, denouncing the possible effects of redefining the events of 9/11 as a civil crime rather than an act of war.
-Amy Greene
Obama has yet to issue a decision on an Afghan strategy. There are 4 options on the table - McChrystal's “all-in” of 40,000 troops; Gates/Clinton's preferred "middle road" of 30,000 troops; a more "user friendly" option of 20,000 troops; and a fourth with no numbers attached. The "user friendly" option would surely better suit the public mood – currently 54% of the American public disapproves of escalation. The fourth option is seen as a gesture to Joe Biden, the administration's leading voice against sending more troops.
Obama has demonstrated a tendency to err on the side of meticulous decision-making rather than on speed. But as David Broder noted, sometimes any decision is better than none. Having already promised (and sent) more troops this summer, Obama demands that any further US action must be accompanied by "offramps," effective means to hand the job over to sufficiently trained Afghans.
A series of cables sent to Obama by Ambassador and General Karl Eikenberry were leaked this week, refreshing a stale debate in Washington while giving the president some additional political cover. By arguing against troop escalation (that would diminish Afghan ability to meet the challenges of a post-American Afghanistan) and by questioning both Karzai and his government’s corruption, Eikenberry returned the focus to questions surrounding the still-undefined strategy: Is the goal to capture Al-Qaeda? To root out the Taliban? Is it to bring security to the Afghan people? To battle corruption? What role for Pakistan? No consensus seems to exist around where the central focus lies.
ASIA
Obama traveled to Asia this week in a multi-stop tour of the region scheduled around the APEC summit and subsequent ASEAN leaders meeting. He also held a bilateral with Russian President Medvedev. The APEC meeting produced underwhelming results on climate change, as leaders failed to formalize a binding accord in advance of December's Copenhagen Summit.
The trip marks a milestone in US-Burma relations in which Obama and Burmese leaders sat at the same table. Though not a bilateral, Obama used the occasion to introduce direct talks to the current sanctions-heavy policy and to call for the release of Aung San Suu Kyi. While looking for new avenues to cooperate with China, Obama and President Hu Jintao are expected to discuss the value of the Chinese currency, increasing Chinese consumption of US goods, bilateral economic relations, and human rights.
Obama also has an obligation to use this trip to reassure smaller regional allies who view America’s realpolitik approach vis-à-vis big powers with skepticism. Obama must reassure them that America will help mitigate the rise of China and uphold its security guarantees in the face of China’s rise, Russian ambitions, and North Korean proliferation. Obama must make the effort to show these smaller allies that America will not relax its commitments and thus make acquiescence to Beijing an undesired - yet necessary - political choice for these nations.
MIDDLE EAST
On Monday, November 9, Obama sat down one-on-one with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Major topics purportedly included Mahmoud Abbas' threat to quit and the consequences of a possible collapse of the Palestinian Authority on the flagging peace process. Since Secretary Clinton called Israel's nine-month suspension of new settlements "unprecedented," the White House has fought to repair the fallout from Clinton's gaffe. Chief of Staff Rahm Emanuel called publicly for a full freeze. Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Bill Burns then said Israel's efforts "fall short" of their "obligations" under the roadmap. A good faith message to reassure Abbas, Burns' language is notable because Palestinians consider a settlement freeze an Israeli obligation rather than a mere “precondition.”
TERRORISM
Attorney General Eric Holder announced his decision to try 9/11 mastermind Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and four other Gitmo detainees in civilian federal court in New York. Should problems arise in the prosecution, Obama risks backlash from politicians who do not want terrorists brought to court in their districts. The political price could be retaliation against other parts of the Obama agenda. Nonetheless, Obama's move demonstrates the administration's eagerness to bring the perpetrators to justice (Mohammed has repeatedly confessed not only to planning 9/11 but also to killing Wall Street Journal reporter Daniel Pearl). Many critics regret this move, denouncing the possible effects of redefining the events of 9/11 as a civil crime rather than an act of war.
-Amy Greene
Wednesday, March 11, 2009
POTUS WATCH - AFGHANISTAN
Now that the new Administration has hit the ground running, POTUS Watch will move beyond an analytical recap of key advisors to focus on an analysis of these advisors around specific foreign policy issues.
POTUS Watch's new direction begins with this issue, themed around Afghanistan.
Potus Watch, Afghanistan
-Amy
POTUS Watch's new direction begins with this issue, themed around Afghanistan.
Potus Watch, Afghanistan
-Amy
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