AMERICA TESTED BY THE RISE OF FOREIGN NATIONALISMS (ENA HORS LES MURS)

My recent article, "America Tested by the Rise Foreign Nationalisms," was published in the April 2015 edition of ENA Hors les Murs.

The article takes a look at US foreign policy, and Washington's posture abroad, when confronted by the rise of nationalisms around the globe - looking especially at the cases of its sole peer competitor (China), historical allies (Japan, Israel), and potential strategic partners (India, Russia) - and the particular challenges each poses to US interests.

The consequences, posited in this article, demand a reflection on the US' role and means in defending and projecting its influence amid shifting balances in a world dissatisfied with the consequences of globalization, as evidenced by the rëemergence of powerful "domestic fronts."

The full article (in French) after the jump.

OBAMA REELECTION CONFIRMS SHIFT IN US STRATEGIC CULTURE (IRSEM)

The reelection of Barack Obama confirms a shift in American strategic culture and has served to highlight deep and meaningful demographic and ideological transformations in the American electorate and in its foreign political preferences.

CAPITAL BRIEF - ROMNEY ON DEFENSE POLICY

Here is the sixth issue of Capital Brief, from July 17, analyzing Mitt Romney's (still vague) defense policy proposals and their consequences.

Click below to read the Brief.

SPOTLIGHT ON...: MICHAEL McFAUL, US AMBASSADOR TO RUSSIA

Earlier this week, Secretary Clinton swore in Michael McFaul as the US's new ambassador to Russia.

Considered to be one of the foremost American experts on Russia, McFaul was most recently the head advisor on Russia and Eurasia in Obama's National Security Council and architect of Obama's Russia reset policy. The choice of McFaul represents Obama's determination to "keep Russian-American relations a centerpiece of his foreign policy after his early push to reset the relationship following years of growing tension."

An expert on Russia, democracy, and electoral politics, McFaul's deep reaching connections in Moscow and reputation as a tough negotiator will be useful at a time when (in his own words) "the alignment of our interests and values is neither simple nor easy"; when the two nations' cooperation is both critical and deep-reaching but not without obstacles.

He is known to be an avid supporter of Russian democratization efforts and in opposition to Putin's repression of dissent. In the past, McFaul has been denounced by a member of the Russian Duma and later invited to Russia by Yelstin's inner circle.

During her remarks, Clinton said: "The coming months and years will be crucial for Russian democracy. Russians from all walks of life and every corner of this great country are making their voices heard, both face to face and in cyberspace, expressing their hopes for the future. [...] I can think of no better representative of our values and our interest in a strong, politically vibrant, open, democratic Russia, as well as a deepening U.S.-Russian partnership."

McFaul is a Stanford political science professor (on leave) and is affiliated with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Eurasia Foundation, and Freedom House (among others). He will be only the second US ambassador to Russia in the previous thirty years who was not a career diplomat.

To read more:
- McFaul Sworn In As New U.S. Envoy To Russia (Radio Free Europe)
- Policy Adviser Tapped to Become U.S. Ambassador to Russia (NY Times)
- Michael McFaul Biography (Carnegie Endowment)

- Amy Greene

(photo credit: Carnegie)

AMERICAN POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON MIDDLE EAST PEACE (LCI)

Last evening, July 11, I was a guest on Le 17/20 on French news channel, LCI. The panel was intended to focus on yesterday's meeting of the Middle East Quartet in Washington DC, but evolved into a discussion primarily about Israeli and Palestinian internal politics.

I contributed an analysis of the American political landscape with the following reflections:

--How strong is Obama's political will to press this issue? Currently on his plate: consuming debt negotiations and the early stages of the 2012 electoral cycle. Israel's defense and security is a US domestic electoral issue. Even if Obama were willing to take a harder line to transform his May 2011 speech into action, this would necessarily involve increased pressure on Israel and opening himself (and his campaign) to avid criticism from across the two-party spectrum, including from representatives protecting their own seats in their home districts.

--A closer look at US domestic opposition to the Palestinian vote this September: I signaled the resolution proposed by Reps. Cantor (R-VA) and Hoyer (D-MD), which passed the House almost unanimously (407-6), and threatens to suspend aid to Palestine if they proceed with the UN vote this September and advance toward a deal with Hamas.

--The US's inability to translate words to action: Again, no progress to speak of following Obama's speech; the loss of a widely-respected envoy (Mitchell) who failed to invest the two parties in productive dialogue; a replacement for Mitchell, David Hale, who has barely been visible on the issue; and an American administration very reticent to convene the Quartet out of almost total disbelief that it could produce any effective course of action heading into the summer.

--I suggested that Washington's paradoxical objectives (protection of Israel while maintaining access to Arab oil supplies) can often create an obstacle to developing a coherent policy in the region.

- Amy Greene

AMERICA'S NEW FOREIGN POLICY AGENDA: LESSONS FOR EUROPE (IRSEM)

Appearing in the most recent installment of La Lettre de l'IRSEM is an article I wrote assessing the current and coming priorities in US foreign policy as well as a few possible areas for increased transatlantic cooperation.

The succinct policy brief highlights:

- Current realities and priorities in US foreign policy
- World views of the Democratic and Republican parties
- Areas for closer EU-US cooperation and strategic development
Click here to read the article online at the IRSEM (Institut de Recherche Stratégique de l'Ecole Militaire) website.

Or Click Here to download the article in PDF format.

- Amy Greene

SACEUR ADM. STAVRIDIS IN PARIS: EUROPE, NATO'S 21ST CENTURY SECURITY CHALLENGES

In a discussion held in Paris yesterday evening, the SACEUR, Admiral James Stavridis, laid out his 21st Century vision for European security, citing the principal challenges facing the European space (more broadly, NATO) and emphasizing possibility therein for Alliance members to pool resources, ideas and money to innovate solutions.

The list of challenges largely echoes the political imperatives set forth by Secretary Clinton and Ambassador Daalder during their own recent visits to Paris and demonstrates the coherence in the Administration’s line on its policy priorities. The real challenges evoked by Admiral Stavridis can also be read as a wish list, a call to action even, of ways that the US would like to see Europe increase its leadership vis-à-vis the transatlantic relationship.

Beyond the list of challenges cited below, the Admiral vividly advocated that Europe get on board to forge meaningful strategic cooperation with Russia including eventual missile defense, to increase Euro-American manufacturing and industrial ties in the construction of defense materials, and to carve out a more significant role for Turkey in order to maximize its potentially prodigious geopolitical ramifications for the West (but stopped short of calling for EU membership).

Key Challenges:

-Demography: especially the decline in Europe’s population
-Afghanistan: progress is steady, but new avenues of cooperation are essential (public-private partnerships) as is increased focus on civilians (literacy, education initiatives) and better communication with populations
-Ballistic Missiles: many of which are in attack range of the EU
-Terrorism: ultimately a law enforcement issue to be supported by military competences; highlighted point that terrorism poses direct threat to EU soil
-Narcotics: high human costs (deaths, addiction, trafficking of persons) as well as robust financing source for terrorism and corruption
-Flow of Illegal Immigrants: vulnerability to the entry of persons with weapons (possibly nuclear)
-Pirates
-Cybersecurity: special need to protect finance and transportation structures
-Natural Disasters and rapid response capability
-Managing Public Perception of NATO’s actions in the world

Passing mention was also made to Energy Security, more specifically to water, as the Admiral advocated for markets to handle resource management and for governments to manage the related infrastructure issues.

- Amy Greene

HILLARY CLINTON IN PARIS: MAJOR ADDRESS ON EUROPEAN SECURITY

This afternoon, January 29, Secretary Clinton delivered a major address on European Security in conjunction with the US Embassy and IRSEM, the Ministry of Defense's strategic studies think tank (Institut de Recherche Stratégique de l'Ecole Militaire).

While emphasizing the need for collective European-American responses to delicately interlaced global challenges, Clinton voiced her support for the Lisbon Treaty, Europe's decision-making autonomy, and praised Europe as a model of transformative power. Though she did mention areas for improvement (need for democratization in certain zones, increased economic opportunity, revamped arms control regime and updated EU/North American institutions fit to manage new problems) and new frontiers for collaboration (cyberterror, terrorism, climate change, energy security).

While assuring the audience that the US's security is anchored in Europe ("Much of what we hope to achieve globally depends on our European partners") based largely on shared, universal values, Clinton asserted the six core principles guiding America's views on European security:

1. Sovereignty of All States to choose allies, provide for their defense, and define boundaries while rejecting claims to spheres of influence.

2. Indivisibility of European Security - there is one Europe with the US as its partner, and sometimes Russia too. It is time to move beyond false divisions (ie: NATO v. non-NATO, EU v; non-EU, etc.) in order to meet common goals.

3. Unwavering Commitment to Article V of NATO - the US will use missile defense to protect all NATO territory. The US is working to engage Moscow to convince it of the stake Russia holds in the presence of nearby missile defense.

4. Practicing Transparency in Dealing with Europe - global threats demand more open exchanges between militaries (info, exercises, site visits). The US supports a revived CFE Treaty for a modern security framework that limits deployment, reinforces territorial integrity, and meets new challenges.

5. Commitment to Non-Proliferation through support of existing treaties, negotiation of new nuclear posture, press other nations to reduce their arsenals and secure stocks.

6. Support Democratization Efforts in order to nourish free expression, encourage development, and end abuses like human trafficking. In this context, the US strongly supports strengthening the OSCE.

Other central topics raised by Clinton:
- Russia: engagement to meet challenges like Iran, climate change, energy security, and non-proliferation.
- China: use a mix of existing institutions to work with Beijing. Key elements: promote military transparency, convince them to sanction Iran, include them in strategic moves like the North Korea talks
- NATO Enlargement: Clinton voiced support for ongoing NATO enlargement plans with Eastern European nations. When this author asked about including non-Western nations who meet membership criteria, Clinton opposed stretching NATO's geography but cited NATO/ISAF as an example of successful cross-hemisphere cooperation that could be applied to other issues like cyberterror.

Click HERE for full text, taken from the State Department.

- Amy Greene

MOUNTING US CRITICISM OF POSSIBLE FRANCO-RUSSIAN ARMS SALE

The Cable has an interesting piece about growing US opposition to a potential French arms sale to Russia. The item in question is the Mistral, an assault ship and currently the second largest in the French Navy. If completed, the transaction would be the first major deal between a NATO country and Russia.

Congresswoman Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (top Republican on the House Foreign Affairs Committee) has introduced a bill to oppose the sale and has called on US leaders to oppose the deal until Russia withdraws entirely from Georgiam territory and implements human rights and rule of law reforms. Some US critics argue that this proposed sale would trigger a chain reaction of sales to Russia in order to bolster Europe's industry, protect its domestic defense jobs, and compensate for its sagging defense budgets. Russia has already been in talks with Spain and the Netherlands for helicopter carriers.

Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia have all expressed worry, especially noting the symbolic implications a potentially-threatening sale originating from a fellow NATO member. While the Baltic States are assured NATO security guarantees, Georgia is not. The concern that the sale would render Georgia vulnerable to Russian military force, this time with implicit NATO consent, was made more real after a Russian Naval Commander remarked that a Mistral would allow Russia to take Georgia in minutes rather than weeks.

Paris insists that no sale is imminent, that a request made by Moscow is being considered, and that any Mistral sold would be a stripped down model. The Cable quotes Prime Minister François Fillon saying that arms deals with Russia are key to peace and stability and an important part of a strategic partnership: "It would be impossible to call for continental stability in partnership with Russia if we refuse to sell armaments to Russia. A refusal would amount to contradicting our own discourse."

Besides the payment of a hefty sum and the guarantee of jobs, what does Paris expect from this deal in the middle- and long-term? Is it prepared to hand over significant sea power to the Russians, quite possibly at Georgia's expense, all while depending on Georgia's contributions to key NATO missions? And symbolically, does Paris want to reward a Russia that has publicly vowed to use this technology against Georgia in what could be a reprise to the 2008 crisis which France's own Sarkozy helped to halt? And more, where lies the pragmatic, new realist balance between normalizing relations, exercising diplomatic short-sightedness, and stoking old Cold War-era fears?

- Amy Greene

SPOTLIGHT ON...: IAN KELLY, US REPRESENTATIVE TO THE OSCE

Pending confirmation by the US Senate, current State Department spokesman Ian Kelly will move to Vienna as the US's representative to the Organization for Security and Cooperation with the rank of ambassador.

Kelly has significant knowledge of Europe and a regional expertise in Eastern Europe/Russia. The State Department spokesman since May 2009, Kelly spent the first months of the Obama administration as deputy assistant secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs. From 2007-2009, he was director of the Office of Russian Affairs overseeing Russia, Ukraine, Moldova, and Belarus. From 2004-2007, he spent time at the US Mission to NATO as a public affairs counselor.

During the Clinton administration, Kelly was the State Department's Director of Democratic Initiatives to the Newly Independent States during which time he helped to coordinate democracy-building efforts in both former Soviet republics and in Russia.

-Amy Greene

THE NEW AMERICAN ARROGANCE? ALLIES' FRUSTRATION OVER OBAMA'S APPROACH

In an op-ed in yesterday's New York Times, Maureen Dowd writes that the firing of White House Counsel Greg Craig, a political death caused by "a thousand leaks," "sent a chill through some Obama supporters" who saw this as the most disgraceful moment in his young presidency. Recalling Obama’s decision not to help Caroline Kennedy in her quest to replace Hillary Clinton in the Senate after all she did to support his candidacy, Dowd notes that "many donors and passionate supporters are let down by Obama’s detachment, puzzled at his failure to make them feel invested when he’s certain to come back to tap their well soon enough."

This assessment holds true, too, in the foreign policy realm.

Secretary Clinton's trip to the Middle East uncovered the bankruptcy of America’s strategy while also exposing its unwillingness to challenge Jerusalem's violation of its roadmap obligations. The US's equivocal response sent a message – to rising powers, that there is as of yet no real price to challenging the US; to smaller powers, that America will defer to a so-called bigger power, even when the big power's aggressions force others to bear the costs.

In Europe, where Obamania is at its most fervent, many sense that the president dispatches others to drum up increased support (money/troops for Afghanistan, etc.) but treats the continent's leaders with contempt, disdain, or indifference. There are a growing number of signals that Obama dismisses Europe but for when it is expedient not to. Obama’s dealings with President Sarkozy are tense, despite the French president’s concerted effort to move closer to the US including through French reintegration into NATO's Central Command. Otherwise, Obama refused five times (before accepting) to meet PM Brown at the G20 summit in Pittsburgh, sent Secretary Clinton to the Berlin Wall commemorations in November, and recently charged Vice President Biden with a European delegation dinner held at the White House even though Obama was in town.

Beyond Europe, similar resentments are emerging. In Eastern and Central Europe, in Asia, smaller nations in the shadows of rising or resurgent powers have aligned with America and depend on the security and economic guarantee the alliance offers. These countries worry that US rapprochement with big powers comes without any counter-demands, that its willingness to dialogue with anyone reveals few strongly-developed bedrock stances, and that its failure (or impotence) to assert itself against North Korean, Iranian, or even Israeli aggression does not bode well for future dust-ups. They perceive an exceedingly conciliatory America and fear an impending dilemma – choosing between Washington and Beijing, or Moscow, etc. – a decision that has less to do with choice, and more about the lack of it.

Obama may be the most popular guy in school, but he cannot stay that way without the support of his peers. American allies want Obama to succeed without being cast aside in a flurry of gestures designed to placate former adversaries or to avoid sparking any new tensions. Among the dangers of Obama's approach is the threat of a new American arrogance. Instead of taking its basis in the Bush-era belief in the superiority of America's values, it risks to be the result of a leader's inflated sense of personal importance and entitlement to unwavering ally support. Should Obama believe too deeply in his cult of personality and travel the world asking always for more without giving the necessary reassurances, he risks disappointing America's most steadfast partners once again - this time, the culprit will not be a president seen to have little regard for global opinion as was the case with Bush. Rather, Obama would undermine true solidarity by breaking with the very premise of his election - a return to respectful dialogue and cooperation not only with adversaries, but with all.

-Amy Greene

THE WEEK IN US FOREIGN POLICY (9-15 NOVEMBER)

AFGHANISTAN
Obama has yet to issue a decision on an Afghan strategy. There are 4 options on the table - McChrystal's “all-in” of 40,000 troops; Gates/Clinton's preferred "middle road" of 30,000 troops; a more "user friendly" option of 20,000 troops; and a fourth with no numbers attached. The "user friendly" option would surely better suit the public mood – currently 54% of the American public disapproves of escalation. The fourth option is seen as a gesture to Joe Biden, the administration's leading voice against sending more troops.

Obama has demonstrated a tendency to err on the side of meticulous decision-making rather than on speed. But as David Broder noted, sometimes any decision is better than none. Having already promised (and sent) more troops this summer, Obama demands that any further US action must be accompanied by "offramps," effective means to hand the job over to sufficiently trained Afghans.

A series of cables sent to Obama by Ambassador and General Karl Eikenberry were leaked this week, refreshing a stale debate in Washington while giving the president some additional political cover. By arguing against troop escalation (that would diminish Afghan ability to meet the challenges of a post-American Afghanistan) and by questioning both Karzai and his government’s corruption, Eikenberry returned the focus to questions surrounding the still-undefined strategy: Is the goal to capture Al-Qaeda? To root out the Taliban? Is it to bring security to the Afghan people? To battle corruption? What role for Pakistan? No consensus seems to exist around where the central focus lies.

ASIA
Obama traveled to Asia this week in a multi-stop tour of the region scheduled around the APEC summit and subsequent ASEAN leaders meeting. He also held a bilateral with Russian President Medvedev. The APEC meeting produced underwhelming results on climate change, as leaders failed to formalize a binding accord in advance of December's Copenhagen Summit.

The trip marks a milestone in US-Burma relations in which Obama and Burmese leaders sat at the same table. Though not a bilateral, Obama used the occasion to introduce direct talks to the current sanctions-heavy policy and to call for the release of Aung San Suu Kyi. While looking for new avenues to cooperate with China, Obama and President Hu Jintao are expected to discuss the value of the Chinese currency, increasing Chinese consumption of US goods, bilateral economic relations, and human rights.

Obama also has an obligation to use this trip to reassure smaller regional allies who view America’s realpolitik approach vis-à-vis big powers with skepticism. Obama must reassure them that America will help mitigate the rise of China and uphold its security guarantees in the face of China’s rise, Russian ambitions, and North Korean proliferation. Obama must make the effort to show these smaller allies that America will not relax its commitments and thus make acquiescence to Beijing an undesired - yet necessary - political choice for these nations.

MIDDLE EAST
On Monday, November 9, Obama sat down one-on-one with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Major topics purportedly included Mahmoud Abbas' threat to quit and the consequences of a possible collapse of the Palestinian Authority on the flagging peace process. Since Secretary Clinton called Israel's nine-month suspension of new settlements "unprecedented," the White House has fought to repair the fallout from Clinton's gaffe. Chief of Staff Rahm Emanuel called publicly for a full freeze. Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Bill Burns then said Israel's efforts "fall short" of their "obligations" under the roadmap. A good faith message to reassure Abbas, Burns' language is notable because Palestinians consider a settlement freeze an Israeli obligation rather than a mere “precondition.”

TERRORISM
Attorney General Eric Holder announced his decision to try 9/11 mastermind Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and four other Gitmo detainees in civilian federal court in New York. Should problems arise in the prosecution, Obama risks backlash from politicians who do not want terrorists brought to court in their districts. The political price could be retaliation against other parts of the Obama agenda. Nonetheless, Obama's move demonstrates the administration's eagerness to bring the perpetrators to justice (Mohammed has repeatedly confessed not only to planning 9/11 but also to killing Wall Street Journal reporter Daniel Pearl). Many critics regret this move, denouncing the possible effects of redefining the events of 9/11 as a civil crime rather than an act of war.

-Amy Greene