A LOOK AT CHUCK HAGEL AND JOHN BRENNAN : OBAMA'S PENTAGON AND CIA NOMINEES

Chuck Hagel: Nominee, Secretary of Defense

Having Chuck Hagel (age: 66), an Obama confidante, at the head of the Pentagon is intended largely to provide political cover to end combat operations in Afghanistan and to begin to implement deep Pentagon budget cuts.

Hagel is chair of the Atlantic Council and member of Obama’s Intelligence Advisory Board. He was formerly a Republican senator from Nebraska (1997-2009) and head of an investment banking firm. A two-time Purple Heart recipient, he would be the first Vietnam veteran to serve as Secretary of Defense. Hagel is known – and disparaged by many Republicans – for his independence vis-à-vis party orthodoxy on foreign policy issues and for holding views considered to be views outside of the conservative mainstream (ex. opposition to Iraq troop surge). Indeed, the vivid battle over his nomination has already begun among prominent Republicans, neoconservatives, Democrats, and pro-Israeli groups.

Opposition to Hagel is tri-fold. He has encountered major criticism for past statements about the pro-Israel lobby”: “[It] intimidates a lot of people around here. I havealways argued against some of the dumb things they do because I don't thinkit's [...] smart for Israel.” He has refused to add his signature to letters circulated around DC by AIPAC. Although Hagel has considerably better relations with other arms of said lobby (J-Street, Israel Policy Forum), and the support of heavyweights like Zbigniew Brzezinski, Brent Scowcroft, and most former US ambassadors to Israel, hardliners believe he will antagonize Israel. And to the contrary of the president, Hagel opposes sanctions against Iran, favors negotiations with Hamas and Iran, and has criticized the largesse of America’s defense spending.

Democratic opposition to Hagel centers mainly around a negative remark made about a gay colleague a decade ago. He has since apologized for the comment and has publicly stated his support for openly gay military service.

That Hagel personally knows war and has shown no reserve in expressing his reluctance to go to war may well have an impact abroad (US approach to Iran, willingness to align with Israel’s policies) as well as “at home” (increased attention to returned soldiers).

It is thought that Democrats will ultimately support the President’s choice and that Republicans will find it difficult to confront the potential backlash of opposing a decorated Vietnam War hero. But if Hagel wins a bitter nomination fight, Republicans may consider him weak and show less flexibility in cutting a deal to prevent the sequester from taking effect in late February.

John Brennan: Nominee, Director of CIA

Current Deputy NSA for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism and close confidante of Obama, John Brennan (age: 57) is a career CIA agent who has been party to nearly every national security question issue in the Obama administration (including the raid on Bin Laden). Brennan was considered for the job of CIA director in 2008, but withdrew his name for consideration after facing accusations over past public support for “enhanced interrogation techniques” and sending prisoners to countries where torture might occur. Detractors insist that as a high-ranking official inBush’ CIA, Brennan condoned tactics like waterboarding that are considered torturous. In 2009, he condemned such practices.

A primary question elicited by this pick is whether the CIA will maintain, reinforce even, its current place at the heart of counter-terror operations, or if Brennan will usher it back to its traditional espionage capacities.

During his 25 years at the CIA, Brennan exercised a wide variety of functions, including the post of station chief in Saudi Arabia. Following his time in government, Brennan was head of a security consultancy, The Analysis Corporation, as well as chair of the Intelligence and National Security Alliance, and the director of the National Counterterrorism Center. Brennan speaks fluent Arabic.

Related Reading
Obama’s Nominations of Hagel and Brennan Signal Course Adjustments at Pentagon and CIA (WaPo)
Brennan Pick Revives Leaks Dispute (Politico)

Choice to Lead C.I.A. Faces a Changed Agency (NYT)

photo credits: Associated Press

TWO WEEKS FROM ELECTION DAY: DEBATING THE LAST WEEKS OF A VERY TIGHT RACE (FRANCE 24)

Last night on France 24's Le Débat, hosted by Vanessa Burggraf, we were a panel of four to discuss the result of the final presidential debate, the state of the race heading into the final two weeks including the keys to victory, and the contrasting foreign policy visions of the two candidates (including Obama's first term foreign policy).

Also on the panel were Philip Golub, Stuart Haugen and Anne Kraatz.

Video (in French) after the jump.

SACEUR ADM. STAVRIDIS IN PARIS: EUROPE, NATO'S 21ST CENTURY SECURITY CHALLENGES

In a discussion held in Paris yesterday evening, the SACEUR, Admiral James Stavridis, laid out his 21st Century vision for European security, citing the principal challenges facing the European space (more broadly, NATO) and emphasizing possibility therein for Alliance members to pool resources, ideas and money to innovate solutions.

The list of challenges largely echoes the political imperatives set forth by Secretary Clinton and Ambassador Daalder during their own recent visits to Paris and demonstrates the coherence in the Administration’s line on its policy priorities. The real challenges evoked by Admiral Stavridis can also be read as a wish list, a call to action even, of ways that the US would like to see Europe increase its leadership vis-à-vis the transatlantic relationship.

Beyond the list of challenges cited below, the Admiral vividly advocated that Europe get on board to forge meaningful strategic cooperation with Russia including eventual missile defense, to increase Euro-American manufacturing and industrial ties in the construction of defense materials, and to carve out a more significant role for Turkey in order to maximize its potentially prodigious geopolitical ramifications for the West (but stopped short of calling for EU membership).

Key Challenges:

-Demography: especially the decline in Europe’s population
-Afghanistan: progress is steady, but new avenues of cooperation are essential (public-private partnerships) as is increased focus on civilians (literacy, education initiatives) and better communication with populations
-Ballistic Missiles: many of which are in attack range of the EU
-Terrorism: ultimately a law enforcement issue to be supported by military competences; highlighted point that terrorism poses direct threat to EU soil
-Narcotics: high human costs (deaths, addiction, trafficking of persons) as well as robust financing source for terrorism and corruption
-Flow of Illegal Immigrants: vulnerability to the entry of persons with weapons (possibly nuclear)
-Pirates
-Cybersecurity: special need to protect finance and transportation structures
-Natural Disasters and rapid response capability
-Managing Public Perception of NATO’s actions in the world

Passing mention was also made to Energy Security, more specifically to water, as the Admiral advocated for markets to handle resource management and for governments to manage the related infrastructure issues.

- Amy Greene

RICHARD HOLBROOKE, 1941-2010

Richard C. Holbrooke passed away yesterday following complications from surgery to repair a torn aorta. This is the saddening loss of an unrelenting, passionate, tough, and dedicated diplomatic heavyweight.

Strong American Voice in Diplomacy and Crisis (NYT)
Richard Holbrooke Dies: Veteran U.S. diplomat brokered Dayton peace accords (Wash Post)

- Amy Greene

IVO DAALDER IN PARIS: EU/NATO COORDINATION KEY

In an appearance at the Ecole Militaire organised by the Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique and the IRSEM, and timely given his op-ed in today’s Herald Tribune pleading for better EU/NATO coordination, Ivo Daalder spoke about the Alliance leading up to Lisbon and relayed its two main goals:

1. Revitalize NATO for 21st Century realities, and
2. Poise ISAF for success by increasing the number of trainers on the ground.

In a brief, formulaic speech, Daalder developed the metaphor of NATO as a house (foundation: core values, walls: collective defense and cooperative security, roof: common technical capabilities sharing), while praising the consultative analysis that defines the Alliance's internal deliberations and advocating for increased investment in new technologies.

Daalder urged member states to maintain NATO funding levels despite the crisis, arguing it cheaper to spend collectively rather than individually or even bilaterally. As nations tighten their belts, collective projects like NATO deliver a better return on investment for the money spent, which in turn obliges NATO to better-manage its resources, rather than depend on a budget increase, to maximize efficiency in times of austerity.

Daalder took firmer stances in the Q&A, notably on the debilitating lack of coordination between EU and NATO (also the topic of today’s IHT op-ed). The major points:

- Russia: The consensus to reengage is real within NATO, and it is now up to Moscow to set the tone for further cooperation.

- Global NATO: Daalder revised his former position to echo comments made by Secretary Clinton during the Q&A following her January 2010 speech on European security at the IRSEM. NATO is a regional organization called to act globally and should not aspire to become a global policeman capable of supplanting the UN. Rather, establishing cross-regional partnerships is the key to bolstering NATO’s effectiveness beyond its neighborhood without drastically rethinking its current membership.

- EU/NATO: Daalder's harshest criticism and most vehement comments were reserved for this topic. With inefficient inter-agency organization with little interaction but at the highest levels (Rasmussen/Ashton), the NATO/EU relationship is marked by what it lacks: no common capabilities, no coordination, and incredible lack of communication between the two. For Daalder, the US does not care which of the two takes the lead – the key is that they talk and decide who heads which dossier – but rather decries the waste generated by having two parallel, uncoordinated (often overlapping) tracks of action on every dossier.

Little mention was made of Afghanistan, though Daalder acknowledged the “significant increase” of EU resources devoted to that mission and the fact that Europe bears the loss of life in equal measure to the United States.

To read Daalder’s piece on the EU/NATO relationship, published in the International Herald Tribune: LINK

- Amy Greene

(photo credit: US Department of State)

HILLARY CLINTON IN PARIS: MAJOR ADDRESS ON EUROPEAN SECURITY

This afternoon, January 29, Secretary Clinton delivered a major address on European Security in conjunction with the US Embassy and IRSEM, the Ministry of Defense's strategic studies think tank (Institut de Recherche Stratégique de l'Ecole Militaire).

While emphasizing the need for collective European-American responses to delicately interlaced global challenges, Clinton voiced her support for the Lisbon Treaty, Europe's decision-making autonomy, and praised Europe as a model of transformative power. Though she did mention areas for improvement (need for democratization in certain zones, increased economic opportunity, revamped arms control regime and updated EU/North American institutions fit to manage new problems) and new frontiers for collaboration (cyberterror, terrorism, climate change, energy security).

While assuring the audience that the US's security is anchored in Europe ("Much of what we hope to achieve globally depends on our European partners") based largely on shared, universal values, Clinton asserted the six core principles guiding America's views on European security:

1. Sovereignty of All States to choose allies, provide for their defense, and define boundaries while rejecting claims to spheres of influence.

2. Indivisibility of European Security - there is one Europe with the US as its partner, and sometimes Russia too. It is time to move beyond false divisions (ie: NATO v. non-NATO, EU v; non-EU, etc.) in order to meet common goals.

3. Unwavering Commitment to Article V of NATO - the US will use missile defense to protect all NATO territory. The US is working to engage Moscow to convince it of the stake Russia holds in the presence of nearby missile defense.

4. Practicing Transparency in Dealing with Europe - global threats demand more open exchanges between militaries (info, exercises, site visits). The US supports a revived CFE Treaty for a modern security framework that limits deployment, reinforces territorial integrity, and meets new challenges.

5. Commitment to Non-Proliferation through support of existing treaties, negotiation of new nuclear posture, press other nations to reduce their arsenals and secure stocks.

6. Support Democratization Efforts in order to nourish free expression, encourage development, and end abuses like human trafficking. In this context, the US strongly supports strengthening the OSCE.

Other central topics raised by Clinton:
- Russia: engagement to meet challenges like Iran, climate change, energy security, and non-proliferation.
- China: use a mix of existing institutions to work with Beijing. Key elements: promote military transparency, convince them to sanction Iran, include them in strategic moves like the North Korea talks
- NATO Enlargement: Clinton voiced support for ongoing NATO enlargement plans with Eastern European nations. When this author asked about including non-Western nations who meet membership criteria, Clinton opposed stretching NATO's geography but cited NATO/ISAF as an example of successful cross-hemisphere cooperation that could be applied to other issues like cyberterror.

Click HERE for full text, taken from the State Department.

- Amy Greene

NEW MOMENTUM FOR US EXPORT-REGIME CONTROL REFORM?

On January 13, it was reported that Secretary Gates, Deputy Defense Secretary William Lynn, and Acquisitions chief Ash Carter met with Aerospace Industries Association (AIA), a top trade lobby comprised of leading defense industry executives (including those of Lockheed and Boeing), to discuss the future of government/industry collaboration.
The meeting comes in the days leading up to the conclusion of the administration's review of export regime controls, commissioned in August 2009 and due for release later this month.

Gates praised the industry for rapidly meeting the Pentagon's needs in Iraq and Afghanistan, including prompt provision of drones and mine-resistant vehicles. He pledged to secure growth in the Defense budget, arguing that the task would be greatly facilitated by an industry that vigilantly cuts costs and delivers provisions on-time.

Gates also threw his full support behind AIA-backed export-regime control reforms. Typically opposed by the Pentagon, Gates' reversal gives new hope to proponents of acquisition and export-control reform. Though he is not the first official to favor the idea - in September 2009, Secretary Clinton and other senior officials (like assistant SecStates Andrew Shapiro and Ellen Tauscher, as well as NSA James Jones) called to remake the notorious ITAR regulations.

The meeting, coupled with the administration's commitment to reshape export controls, raises a few questions:
- How commercially-driven will the White House allow export-regime reform to become?
- How implicated will America's allies be in redrawing the US Munitions list?
- How will the Administration explain any eventual reforms in order to mitigate critics who call the administration weak on national security and seek to damage the White House's credibility in the lead-up to midterm elections?

Also, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee is expected to introduce legislation in late January (around the time of the release of the White House strategic review) calling for a Congressional conference that will likely raise the topic of easing restrictions on communications satellite exports.

Prior to its meeting with Gates, the AIA gave President Obama a letter calling for reform on the basis that the current regulations cost US exporters billions in annual sales and weaken defense-related industries that are implicated in the construction and production of new technologies. The list of goods on the US Munitions List is outdated and includes many banal items while excluding far more threatening technologies such as stealth and night vision.

The AIA outlined four key areas for reform, elements to which Gates has now voiced his support:
1. Updating the US Munitions List and commodity jurisdiction
2. More efficient, clearer division of responsibility between government agencies in caseload management
3. Placing decision-making on technology release in the hands of the Defense Department
4. Treatment of drones as a Category I item in the multilateral Missile Technology Control Regime

- Amy Greene

ISAF COMMANDER, LT. GEN. RODRIGUEZ ON AFGHANISTAN

Stars and Stripes has published a December 31, 2009 interview with Lt. Gen. David Rodriguez, the first Commander of International Security Assistance Force Joint Command.

Lt. Gen. Rodriguez emphasizes:
- creating and linking secure zones to give Afghan people an environment in which to thrive, work, and prosper
- engaging in relationship-building to gain the people's trust and incite widespread development
- work closely at all levels of government to encourage good governance practices and instill sense of local ownership over the situation

Rodriguez defines victory in Afghanistan:
"Victory [...] is an Afghanistan that can govern itself well enough to prevent the rise of extremism [...] [Y]ou have to have security forces that can secure the people, [...] a government that can provide for the basic services and take care of its people, and then [...] a people that have a belief in and confidence that their government and their security forces can take care of them and is going to provide them an opportunity for their future."

Explanation of "Embedding":
"We [...] partner all the way up at our level so [...] we have people from the Minister of Interior, Minister of Defense; besides for bringing all of their expertise to our operations center; combined planning and combined operations is helping out tremendously. When I travel, I travel around with the Afghan leaders, [...] they see 70% of the things and I don’t see 30% of things because they know what to look for [...]. It goes from the top to the bottom to learn a rural understanding of how you can best help them [...]. "

The Afghan National Security Forces
"We are trying to build up the Afghan National Security Forces as fast as we can; I’m responsible for training the ‘field-force’ out there and then NTMA/CSTCA is responsible for institutional training; so we partner together to do that; and again, after you leave the institution you get through the basic training and you go out to the field, [...] training is constant [...] One of the key ways to do that is the partnering because [...] when you work that close together [...] it increases the effectiveness of our operations [...] [W]e think it is the best and fastest way to develop the leadership capability in the Afghan National Security Forces, which is really going to be the thing that sustains it in the future."

The Afghan Army and Police forces:
"They are in a wide range of capabilities dependent on, of-course, their partners and how well they’ve been able to effectively train to develop that leadership, and literacy [...] [With] the Police, we started a little bit later, developing, putting a lot of effort into the development of the Police; and then the Police was a fielded force already, versus growing the Army from the bottom. So we’ve got a little bit more to do on the Police, relatively speaking, but I think we’ll be able to make some progress."

Coordinating a 43-nation effort:
"It’s the same thing that you do working with the Afghans. It’s all part of the same solution, you work together and figure out how to maximize the effectiveness of the team [...] [I]t works very, very effectively and there’s some incredible contributions by many of the NATO nations; incredibly brave soldiers and civilians out there all over the place, it’s really inspiring."

The Coalition's major shortcoming and steps to overcome it:
"The partnering piece is a big part [...] and part of the challenge is to ensure that we do things in an Afghan context and ways according the Afghan culture. [...] I think that all that is focused on trying to get a better understanding for the people, better understanding for how the Afghan systems operate and how we can best help them make their system work better and not impose our system."

- Amy Greene

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE ROBERT GATES SIGNS ON FOR ONE MORE YEAR

When Defense Secretary Robert Gates agreed to stay on in his current position for the new president Obama, many speculated that his tenure would be short - just long enough to ensure smooth policy transitions regarding Iraq, Afghanistan, the defense budget, and re-balancing the relative weight of the Pentagon. Surely, Gates's clout in political and military circles, won during service to five presidents and thanks in part to his oversight of the Iraq surge, would be critical to a non-military, "untested" president.

Gates has proven indispensable to President Obama, playing an integral role in shaping the recently-announced Afghanistan strategy to send an additional 30,000 US troops with additional contributions to be made by NATO and other partners.

Secretary Gates will stay on for at least an additional year.

- Amy Greene

NYT: MAKING OF THE AFPAK STRATEGY

This excellent piece in the New York Times lays out how Obama came to choose his recently-announced AfPak surge strategy, focusing both on the process and the actors involved. This must-read piece is based on extensive interviews mainly with the principles and is elsewhere corroborated wherever possible.

Interestingly:

- The manner in which Obama conducted the review encouraged transparency (but confidentiality), frankness, lengthy debate over well-defined opinions, diversity of ideas, and clarity of purpose (also perceived as a lack of deference) from a non-military president confronting a military bureaucracy largely formed by the Bush administration's notion of the treatment of war.

- Gates was of central importance in defining the numbers and mechanics of the strategy. The selection of Gates' own proposal to send 30,000 US troops (with an additional 10,000 coming from NATO) ultimately reflects the president's trust in him - yet another demonstration of the significant bipartisan respect Gates commands throughout Washington.

- Gates, Clinton, and Jones' harmonious collaboration was key to a more thorough examination and to avoiding inter-department drama during the more delicate moments. One example: Clinton was unafraid of asking tough questions about troop specifics that might be seen, in another administration, as stepping on Pentagon turf. This posed no such problem during the recent review process.

- Clinton took leadership with Karzai by compelling him to publicly commit to delivering results. She heavily influenced the content of his inaugural address in which he vowed to clean up corruption and take control of the security situation while making reference to timetables to accomplish this.

- Biden's opposition successfully narrowed the mission and secured Obama's commitment to withdrawal dates, even if his opposition to the surge was not heeded.

- Holbrooke was absent from this process from start to finish. After storming out on a meeting with Karzai and remaining silent since, Holbrooke's place in the AfPak process to come seems precarious at best.

- Amy Greene

IMPRESSIONS OF OBAMA'S AFPAK REMARKS

Last night at West Point, President Obama showed considerable confidence as Commander in Chief as he explained his decision to send 30,000 additional US troops to fight the war in Afghanistan/Pakistan with the first withdrawals beginning in July 2011 and complete pullout by the end of 2011 (depending on ground conditions).

Some reflections on the speech:

The speech did a good job of explaining why the US is in Afghanistan by providing a succinct historical overview dating back to 9/11, without further dramatizing the tragedy of that day. Obama outlined an 18-month window in order to create urgency among Afghans to take responsibility for their own country, effectively ending the "blank check" policy of the Bush administration to the Karzai government. How will this impact Taliban strategy? Knowing the limits of US engagement, will they simply wait it out?

By systematically recalling the early and overwhelming domestic and international support for the US intervention, and by invoking both NATO and the UN, Obama reminded the international community and allies of their past promises and current obligations. While increased allied presence may not come in the form of additional combat troops, Obama seemed to be inciting them to make a greater and more noticeable contribution in some form. Near the end of the speech, Obama mentioned that the US has not always been thanked for its efforts to intervene in the name of global security. This could be read as unspoken criticism of reluctant allies whose collective security is nonetheless affected by the AfPak situation. Perhaps directed in part at allies like French President Nicolas Sarkozy, who has previously rejected the idea of sending additional troops. Most recently, both President Sarkozy and Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner reportedly rebuffed two appeals that came directly from President Obama and Secretary Clinton, respectively, to send 1,500 more French soldiers.

The President successfully painted the AfPak war in the context of his greater foreign policy objectives (ending this war and preventing new conflict, securing loose nuclear material, stopping the spread of nuclear weapons, and ultimately working to a no-nuclear world) and in the global context of US moral values (human rights, rigorous use of diplomacy, freedom, US's special security burden of the past decades) without neglecting to repeatedly mention the ailing US economy and the cost borne by its war weary citizens. In attempting to reassure the 54% of Americans who disapprove of any troop escalation, Obama also answered the primary critics of an Afghan surge (notably the comparisons to Vietnam) in a respectful manner.

In an interesting aside, Obama stated that the US seeks partnership with Afghanistan and Pakistan based on mutual interest, trust, and respect rather than patronage. This "partnership vs. patronage" construction is the same used in a speech he gave to Europe on his first Presidential trip to the continent.

Overall, this address covered all of the necessary bases while successfully explaining the need to escalate. The tone was balanced and decidedly centrist, and the President made sure to outline both the thought and rigor that went into the process.

Still, questions remain unanswered:

-Is the AfPak strategy sufficiently focused on Pakistan and the ways in which its actions both de-legitimize America's progress in Afghanistan and destabilize security conditions in that country?
- Will additional US troops and funding in Afghanistan make any difference without a more coherent and tougher approach to Islamabad? How will the new strategy redefine the US/Pakistan partnership? How will its performance be measured?
- Though European reactions were generally positive, not many allies immediately stepped up to increase their commitments. Perhaps they were hedging their bets until after the January 2010 London conference to be held on Afghanistan. The following remains to be seen:
- How deeply does the EU perceive Afghanistan to be a direct threat to its collective security and to what point is Europe ready to give more to the mission? Will the EU offer a truly "European" approach to Afghanistan, complete with non-negotiables and concessions that it can take to the table in discussions with the US? Or will EU member states prefer instead to rely once again on their US bilateral relationships to hammer out the terms and nature of future commitments?
- And what will be the consequences to the already-troubled transatlantic alliance if the US is convinced that Europe did not make a full, good-faith effort to drum up support for the joint mission at its most critical hour?

-Amy Greene

POTUSPHERE - NATO

Follow the link to read or download the latest issue of Potusphere (formerly Potus Watch) on prominent administration officials working on NATO.

Potusphere, NATO

-Amy Greene

THE WEEK IN US FOREIGN POLICY (9-15 NOVEMBER)

AFGHANISTAN
Obama has yet to issue a decision on an Afghan strategy. There are 4 options on the table - McChrystal's “all-in” of 40,000 troops; Gates/Clinton's preferred "middle road" of 30,000 troops; a more "user friendly" option of 20,000 troops; and a fourth with no numbers attached. The "user friendly" option would surely better suit the public mood – currently 54% of the American public disapproves of escalation. The fourth option is seen as a gesture to Joe Biden, the administration's leading voice against sending more troops.

Obama has demonstrated a tendency to err on the side of meticulous decision-making rather than on speed. But as David Broder noted, sometimes any decision is better than none. Having already promised (and sent) more troops this summer, Obama demands that any further US action must be accompanied by "offramps," effective means to hand the job over to sufficiently trained Afghans.

A series of cables sent to Obama by Ambassador and General Karl Eikenberry were leaked this week, refreshing a stale debate in Washington while giving the president some additional political cover. By arguing against troop escalation (that would diminish Afghan ability to meet the challenges of a post-American Afghanistan) and by questioning both Karzai and his government’s corruption, Eikenberry returned the focus to questions surrounding the still-undefined strategy: Is the goal to capture Al-Qaeda? To root out the Taliban? Is it to bring security to the Afghan people? To battle corruption? What role for Pakistan? No consensus seems to exist around where the central focus lies.

ASIA
Obama traveled to Asia this week in a multi-stop tour of the region scheduled around the APEC summit and subsequent ASEAN leaders meeting. He also held a bilateral with Russian President Medvedev. The APEC meeting produced underwhelming results on climate change, as leaders failed to formalize a binding accord in advance of December's Copenhagen Summit.

The trip marks a milestone in US-Burma relations in which Obama and Burmese leaders sat at the same table. Though not a bilateral, Obama used the occasion to introduce direct talks to the current sanctions-heavy policy and to call for the release of Aung San Suu Kyi. While looking for new avenues to cooperate with China, Obama and President Hu Jintao are expected to discuss the value of the Chinese currency, increasing Chinese consumption of US goods, bilateral economic relations, and human rights.

Obama also has an obligation to use this trip to reassure smaller regional allies who view America’s realpolitik approach vis-à-vis big powers with skepticism. Obama must reassure them that America will help mitigate the rise of China and uphold its security guarantees in the face of China’s rise, Russian ambitions, and North Korean proliferation. Obama must make the effort to show these smaller allies that America will not relax its commitments and thus make acquiescence to Beijing an undesired - yet necessary - political choice for these nations.

MIDDLE EAST
On Monday, November 9, Obama sat down one-on-one with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Major topics purportedly included Mahmoud Abbas' threat to quit and the consequences of a possible collapse of the Palestinian Authority on the flagging peace process. Since Secretary Clinton called Israel's nine-month suspension of new settlements "unprecedented," the White House has fought to repair the fallout from Clinton's gaffe. Chief of Staff Rahm Emanuel called publicly for a full freeze. Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Bill Burns then said Israel's efforts "fall short" of their "obligations" under the roadmap. A good faith message to reassure Abbas, Burns' language is notable because Palestinians consider a settlement freeze an Israeli obligation rather than a mere “precondition.”

TERRORISM
Attorney General Eric Holder announced his decision to try 9/11 mastermind Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and four other Gitmo detainees in civilian federal court in New York. Should problems arise in the prosecution, Obama risks backlash from politicians who do not want terrorists brought to court in their districts. The political price could be retaliation against other parts of the Obama agenda. Nonetheless, Obama's move demonstrates the administration's eagerness to bring the perpetrators to justice (Mohammed has repeatedly confessed not only to planning 9/11 but also to killing Wall Street Journal reporter Daniel Pearl). Many critics regret this move, denouncing the possible effects of redefining the events of 9/11 as a civil crime rather than an act of war.

-Amy Greene

POTUS WATCH - AFGHANISTAN

Now that the new Administration has hit the ground running, POTUS Watch will move beyond an analytical recap of key advisors to focus on an analysis of these advisors around specific foreign policy issues.

POTUS Watch's new direction begins with this issue, themed around Afghanistan.

Potus Watch, Afghanistan

-Amy

POTUS WATCH - NATIONAL SECURITY

This latest edition of Potus Watch focuses on Obama's key national security advisors.

Potus Watch, National Security

-Amy