CAPITAL BRIEF - HOW DID V.P. CANDIDATES MEASURE UP TO EXPECTATIONS?

Here is the last issue of Capital Brief, from October 12, that takes a look at how the vice presidential candidates measured up to expectations in their face-off.

Click below to read the Brief.

LA CHRONIQUE DE AMY GREENE - GIVING CONTEXT TO VP DEBATE (AFRICA 1)

Among the several topics we touched on during this week's Chronique, we discussed:

• The different challenges facing the two vice presidential candidates  (Biden: emerge strong and convincing without gaffe; Ryan: move to center without abandoning hiw own conservatism, consolidate place among GOP leadership) 
• The need for both men to remain on the offensive, hoping to discredit the others' plans and records, without veering too far from the bigger picture themes of the election - the middle class and job creation

Listen after the jump.

EVALUATING THE STAKES LEADING INTO VP DEBATE (RFI)

This morning, I was interviewed by Brent Gregston for RFI English to talk about the stakes of the October 11 vice presidential debate and what to expect from candidates Joseph Biden and Paul Ryan.

The broadcast in English after the jump.

BIDEN IN NYT: MOVING FORWARD IN IRAQ

In an op-ed published in the New York Times, Vice President Biden provides a sort of "State of the Union" of American involvement in Iraq while appealing to Congress to pass the administration's budget proposal for continued support of the civil and security mission there.

As the combat mission has ended, Biden argues that underfunding the non-combat mission would compromise the hard-won stability in that nation, undermining the leaders' ability to strengthen institutions and increase overall stability and security.

Biden cites the following objectives as imperative priorities to attain political and security successes in Iraq, those key and central elements whose funding will be determined by Congress:

- Strengthen both the size and abilities of Iraqi security forces;
- Provide leaders the resources to conduct nation-wide census;
- Integrate Kurdish forces into Iraqi security forces while resolving ongoing internal border disputes (including the fate of Kirkuk);
- Maintain commitments to Sunni groups, crucial to fighting insurgents;
- Pass hydrocarbon law to more evenly distribute oil revenues among the Iraqi people;
- Pass a sound, responsible budget while facilitating economic growth by attracting foreign investment and private sector growth and diversifying revenue sources (beyond oil)

Biden also makes the case that Iraq will soon wield the full power of its natural resources to finance economic and security objectives, and that a continued Iraqi commitment to civil society will result in greater overall autonomy. Until then, US engagement is critical even as the American government seeks to dig itself out of crisis conditions.

- Amy Greene

Source: What We Must Do for Iraq Now - J. Biden (NYT)
Photo credit: The White House

AIPAC 2010: NO END TO THE IMPASSE

Hillary Clinton's speech to the 2010 meeting of AIPAC (American Israel Public Affairs Committee) in Washington on March 22 was, with few exceptions, a conciliatory exercise that did little to chafe the Israel lobby and even less reassure skeptics of the US's role in brokering a viable peace. Without defining any concrete next steps, Clinton nonetheless affirmed her personal support of the Jewish state and described America's commitment to it as “rock solid, unwavering, enduring and forever.”

Here are some highlights from Clinton's speech to AIPAC:
- Explicit nod to the broad regional implications of Israel's refusal to change policies, including several mentions to the legitimate right of Palestinian people to thrive in freedom and peace.

- Unequivocal US support for two-state solution according to 1967 lines, stop to settlement-building, and normalization of Israel's regional relations including with Syria. Affirmed Hamas and Hezbollah as "terrorist organizations" while calling for sanctions that "bite" against an Iran with unrelenting nuclear ambitions.

- Argued that untenability of status quo obliges Israel to change course: demographic reality does not favor Israel; technological advances make more difficult the task of protecting Israel's security through military means alone; and the status quo fuels violent extremist ideology that ultimately jeopardizes peace/security and fuels peace rejectionists' ambitions.

Following Clinton's speech, Prime Minister Netanyahu met with Secretary Clinton then with Vice President Biden. Whatever was said during these sessions, Israeli leaders were not persuaded to change the status quo that Clinton decried in her remarks. For that same evening, before the same conference, Netanyahu categorically refused to stop construction of settlements and insisted that Jerusalem belongs to Israel. This following the "insult" of announcing new settlements during the recent visit of Biden, a staunch long-time advocate for Israel.

Netanyahu's rebuke of the US appears driven by a motivation to resist any push-back from President Obama (however mild it has now proven to be) with the hope of making him a one-term president in order to demonstrate that no US politician can stand firm against Israel nor derail its chosen policies and still remain politically viable. This is an interesting gamble given recent poll results showing Israeli public opinion favoring Obama and showing less enthusiasm for Netanyahu and his Likud party.

The US pays a tremendous amount in annual bilateral aid to be treated as such. More disappointing still is the prospect that the administration lacks the strategic vision and political courage necessary to move beyond lukewarm declarations and to apply effective pressure in the face of opposition in order to yield meaningful results.

President Obama and Prime Minister Netanyahu are expected to meet behind closed doors at the White House on Tuesday, March 23.

- Amy Greene

EMERGING CLINTON DOCTRINE? EARLY LOOK OF HILLARY CLINTON AT STATE

After more than one year into her self-declared one-term tenure, the place Hillary Clinton occupies in US diplomacy is unclear – and questions remain as to how she hopes to shape the office. Is it her goal to mark the American diplomatic heritage with a so-called Clinton Doctrine? Or is she exercising her functions such as to coalesce her abundant international popularity to become a transcendent figure?

Sticking to the job she currently holds, we have some indications of Clinton’s foreign policy style. Early on, she embraced “smart power” as a key to revitalizing US diplomacy, and her foreign trips reflect such a policy – she often holds both high-level meetings and town-hall style events especially targeting young people and students, and namely women and girls. Obama has made this type of outreach a hallmark of his own style, too, so the grassroots approach is not strictly a Clinton innovation (though her celebrity is easily instrumentalized for this purpose). And indeed, the excitement Clinton incites during her travels proves that this approach can be successful.

Speaking of substance, there is disappointingly little to evaluate. Her colleagues at State appreciate her dedication to their internal concerns, from improving the nuts-and-bolts of agency functioning to fighting for increased funding and resources in a way past secretaries have not. Otherwise, and looking outward, Clinton is increasingly assuming the mantle of women's/girls’ rights (a lifelong commitment and political passion), advocating for gender equality grounded on an efficiency-based argument rather than rooted in a moral-imperative. It would be no surprise if Clinton dedicated her post-administration, and post-political, work to advancing progress on this front.

Additionally, appointing envoys was Clinton’s idea. After seeing how little SecStates achieve when spread too thin over too many issues, Clinton was determined assign heavyweights to manage the most demanding issue areas. But with Mitchell coming up short in the Middle East and Holbrooke’s tense relations with Afghan principals including Karzai, there are few concrete successes here to mention.

Until now, Clinton has succeeded in reinvigorating the world's perception of American power via an unrelenting global “hearts and minds” campaign. But she has neither made her mark on any one dossier nor delivered a resounding policy success (cf. failure to secure Brazilian support on Iran sanctions; the Jerusalem gaffe). Much of this is a mere question of time. But the Clinton/Obama dynamic itself may also be at play. The two former rivals will never share the seamless mutual confidence, allowing the secretary to act as proxy for the president, that made other President/Secretary pairs so successful (think Bush/Baker; Nixon/Kissinger). And by sending Biden around the world to problem-solve instead of Clinton, Obama may be signaling the limits of her power. Certainly, Obama gave Clinton full control of Foggy Bottom (including hiring decisions) – but in doing so, did he also marginalize the agency by placing it apart, making it a Clinton sphere that operates at a distance from other key power centers?

Time will tell how Clinton works to define her mandate as Secretary of State, where she will seek to score big wins, and ultimately, how her decisions will translate into imperatives for American action abroad.

- Amy Greene
(photo credit: US State Department)

OBAMA AND GATES: (IN)COMPATIBLE IDEAS ABOUT NUCLEAR SECURITY?

Josh Gerstein at Politico published an account of President Obama's and Secretary Gates's contradictory stances over the development of new nuclear weapons. Obama wants significant reductions in pursuit of a zero-nuke world, whereas Gates has long advocated for sufficient investments to modernize US arsenals. For Gates, re-engineering and modifying current stocks is essential to national security - but at a certain point, and in light of the testing moratorium, old weapons eventually become unreliable and need to be refurbished.

Biden's recent speech on the future of America's nuclear security could then be viewed as a nod to Gates - the unprecedented funding of nuclear technology labs would thus be viewed as a compromise between Obama's refusal to incorporate new nuclear weapons into the 2011 budget and Gates's position on the need to have the most up-to-date and sophisticated mastery of the technological landscape. And the huge influx of funding to the Pentagon would certainly cause no offense.

Ultimately, Gates wants to ensure that US security needs are met through the proper upkeep, updating, and judicious development of nuclear weaponry. He said in September 2009: “We have no desire for new capabilities. That's a red herring. [...] This is about modernizing and keeping safe a capability that everyone acknowledges we will have to have for some considerable period into the future.”

Whether or not Gates himself is satisfied with the emerging administration posture, arms control advocates wonder if the proposed 2011 nuclear lab funding increases could lead to building new nuclear weapons down the road. According to Joseph Cirincione of the Ploughshares Fund, "“That’s a very fair concern,” Cirincione said. “People will be taking a very close look at what the posture review says about the Life Extension Program for exactly this reason."

- Amy Greene

BIDEN @ NDU: MAJOR NUCLEAR SECURITY SPEECH

On February 18, 2010 Vice President Biden addressed the National Defense University in Washington, DC in the presence of Secretaries Gates (Defense) and Chu (Energy) and Undersecretary Ellen Tauscher.

The remarks were given following the recent release of the Pentagon's Quadrennial Defense Review and Ballistic Missile Defense Review.

Biden's aim was to convince the American political Left and Right - and the world - that the administration's recent decision to heavily fund nuclear laboratories is both credible and coherent with its ambitious nonproliferation discourse.

What to Note:
1. The administration views new states proliferation as "the greatest threat facing America," one that could provoke regional destabilization and arms races. In order to stave of its own need to use nuclear and allow for deep reductions in the future, Washington seeks to combine the full range and power of its conventional warheads with adaptive missile defense while still pursuing Obama's Prague Agenda.

2. The role of nuclear weapons laboratories is key to Obama's overall strategy. The decision was made to boost funding for nuclear labs to $7 billion, up by more than a half of a billion dollars and amounting to a $5 billion increase over 5 years. The objective? To manage and guarantee the US arsenal without testing -- safekeeping today means easier dismantling tomorrow; r&d for new means of proliferation helps to track and monitor those seeking such advances.

3. The US seeks to implement its ambitious nonproliferation goals by rallying international consensus and bolstering the nonproliferation regime's cornerstone initiatives (NPT, CTBT, START, United Nations).

4. America is serious about pushing a fissile material ban, despite numerous past setbacks, and will vigorously aim to ratify the CTBT.

5. The Obama administration has an agenda heavy with nonproliferation action: the coming release of the US Nuclear Posture Review, ongoing START follow-up negotiations, April 2010 Nuclear Security Summit in Washington, NPT Review Conference in May 2010.

While the promise to maintain America's military supremacy through conventional weaponry/missile defense may satisfy some, how will it persuade others to forgo their existing nuclear stocks or efforts to access nuclear when the alternative is the US's unmitigated conventional artillery? For certain nations with no conceivable recourse to even the milder register of American military might, how will this declaration by Biden incentivize them to step away from their current nuclear holdings or ambitions?

- Amy Greene

Click for Full Transcript of Biden's Speech (White House)

NYT: MAKING OF THE AFPAK STRATEGY

This excellent piece in the New York Times lays out how Obama came to choose his recently-announced AfPak surge strategy, focusing both on the process and the actors involved. This must-read piece is based on extensive interviews mainly with the principles and is elsewhere corroborated wherever possible.

Interestingly:

- The manner in which Obama conducted the review encouraged transparency (but confidentiality), frankness, lengthy debate over well-defined opinions, diversity of ideas, and clarity of purpose (also perceived as a lack of deference) from a non-military president confronting a military bureaucracy largely formed by the Bush administration's notion of the treatment of war.

- Gates was of central importance in defining the numbers and mechanics of the strategy. The selection of Gates' own proposal to send 30,000 US troops (with an additional 10,000 coming from NATO) ultimately reflects the president's trust in him - yet another demonstration of the significant bipartisan respect Gates commands throughout Washington.

- Gates, Clinton, and Jones' harmonious collaboration was key to a more thorough examination and to avoiding inter-department drama during the more delicate moments. One example: Clinton was unafraid of asking tough questions about troop specifics that might be seen, in another administration, as stepping on Pentagon turf. This posed no such problem during the recent review process.

- Clinton took leadership with Karzai by compelling him to publicly commit to delivering results. She heavily influenced the content of his inaugural address in which he vowed to clean up corruption and take control of the security situation while making reference to timetables to accomplish this.

- Biden's opposition successfully narrowed the mission and secured Obama's commitment to withdrawal dates, even if his opposition to the surge was not heeded.

- Holbrooke was absent from this process from start to finish. After storming out on a meeting with Karzai and remaining silent since, Holbrooke's place in the AfPak process to come seems precarious at best.

- Amy Greene

POTUSPHERE - NATO

Follow the link to read or download the latest issue of Potusphere (formerly Potus Watch) on prominent administration officials working on NATO.

Potusphere, NATO

-Amy Greene

THE WEEK IN US FOREIGN POLICY (9-15 NOVEMBER)

AFGHANISTAN
Obama has yet to issue a decision on an Afghan strategy. There are 4 options on the table - McChrystal's “all-in” of 40,000 troops; Gates/Clinton's preferred "middle road" of 30,000 troops; a more "user friendly" option of 20,000 troops; and a fourth with no numbers attached. The "user friendly" option would surely better suit the public mood – currently 54% of the American public disapproves of escalation. The fourth option is seen as a gesture to Joe Biden, the administration's leading voice against sending more troops.

Obama has demonstrated a tendency to err on the side of meticulous decision-making rather than on speed. But as David Broder noted, sometimes any decision is better than none. Having already promised (and sent) more troops this summer, Obama demands that any further US action must be accompanied by "offramps," effective means to hand the job over to sufficiently trained Afghans.

A series of cables sent to Obama by Ambassador and General Karl Eikenberry were leaked this week, refreshing a stale debate in Washington while giving the president some additional political cover. By arguing against troop escalation (that would diminish Afghan ability to meet the challenges of a post-American Afghanistan) and by questioning both Karzai and his government’s corruption, Eikenberry returned the focus to questions surrounding the still-undefined strategy: Is the goal to capture Al-Qaeda? To root out the Taliban? Is it to bring security to the Afghan people? To battle corruption? What role for Pakistan? No consensus seems to exist around where the central focus lies.

ASIA
Obama traveled to Asia this week in a multi-stop tour of the region scheduled around the APEC summit and subsequent ASEAN leaders meeting. He also held a bilateral with Russian President Medvedev. The APEC meeting produced underwhelming results on climate change, as leaders failed to formalize a binding accord in advance of December's Copenhagen Summit.

The trip marks a milestone in US-Burma relations in which Obama and Burmese leaders sat at the same table. Though not a bilateral, Obama used the occasion to introduce direct talks to the current sanctions-heavy policy and to call for the release of Aung San Suu Kyi. While looking for new avenues to cooperate with China, Obama and President Hu Jintao are expected to discuss the value of the Chinese currency, increasing Chinese consumption of US goods, bilateral economic relations, and human rights.

Obama also has an obligation to use this trip to reassure smaller regional allies who view America’s realpolitik approach vis-à-vis big powers with skepticism. Obama must reassure them that America will help mitigate the rise of China and uphold its security guarantees in the face of China’s rise, Russian ambitions, and North Korean proliferation. Obama must make the effort to show these smaller allies that America will not relax its commitments and thus make acquiescence to Beijing an undesired - yet necessary - political choice for these nations.

MIDDLE EAST
On Monday, November 9, Obama sat down one-on-one with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Major topics purportedly included Mahmoud Abbas' threat to quit and the consequences of a possible collapse of the Palestinian Authority on the flagging peace process. Since Secretary Clinton called Israel's nine-month suspension of new settlements "unprecedented," the White House has fought to repair the fallout from Clinton's gaffe. Chief of Staff Rahm Emanuel called publicly for a full freeze. Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Bill Burns then said Israel's efforts "fall short" of their "obligations" under the roadmap. A good faith message to reassure Abbas, Burns' language is notable because Palestinians consider a settlement freeze an Israeli obligation rather than a mere “precondition.”

TERRORISM
Attorney General Eric Holder announced his decision to try 9/11 mastermind Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and four other Gitmo detainees in civilian federal court in New York. Should problems arise in the prosecution, Obama risks backlash from politicians who do not want terrorists brought to court in their districts. The political price could be retaliation against other parts of the Obama agenda. Nonetheless, Obama's move demonstrates the administration's eagerness to bring the perpetrators to justice (Mohammed has repeatedly confessed not only to planning 9/11 but also to killing Wall Street Journal reporter Daniel Pearl). Many critics regret this move, denouncing the possible effects of redefining the events of 9/11 as a civil crime rather than an act of war.

-Amy Greene

POTUS WATCH - AFGHANISTAN

Now that the new Administration has hit the ground running, POTUS Watch will move beyond an analytical recap of key advisors to focus on an analysis of these advisors around specific foreign policy issues.

POTUS Watch's new direction begins with this issue, themed around Afghanistan.

Potus Watch, Afghanistan

-Amy